We examine the response of U.S. (VIX) and German (VDAX) implied volatility indices to the announcement of interest rate policy decisions by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the European Central Bank (ECB). We present new findings that indicate that VDAX declines on FOMC meeting days, a result that holds for nearly all announcement types. VDAX declines on ECB meeting days in which there is a negative rate surprise or no surprise and is unrelated to ECB meeting days otherwise. VIX is unrelated to ECB meeting days. We confirm prior findings that VIX declines on FOMC meetings days regardless of the content of the meeting. Taken collectively, our results indicate a prominent position for the FOMC in determining uncertainty levels both domestically and abroad relative to a conditional domestic relation between uncertainty levels and the ECB.
Introduction
Interest rate decisions by central banks are noteworthy for researchers given their farreaching effects. While the relation between central bank communication and the equities market has received considerable focus, relatively little is known about the relation of communication to forward-looking volatility. Option implied volatility allows us to infer what the market expects future volatility to be, and implied volatility indices are frequently described as uncertainty or fear indices. VIX has been linked to "fear" by Whaley (2009) and has been used to measure uncertainty in Nikkinen et al. (2007) and Bialkowski et al. (2008) . Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004) , Chen and Clements (2007) , Vahamaa and Aijo (2011) and Krieger et al. (2012) document VIX declines on FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) meeting days in the U.S. market and conclude that FOMC meetings are generally uncertainty resolving, rather than uncertainty creating. However, the impact of other, non-U.S. central bank communications on volatility is unaddressed by the previous literature. Similarly, the literature has not addressed cross-border volatility responses to foreign central bank announcements. We consider these issues in this paper by examining similarly constructed volatility indices in the U.S. and Germany and scheduled rate decisions by the FOMC and ECB (European Central Bank).
Additionally, we are the first, to our knowledge, to examine the relation between scheduled central bank meetings and implied volatility decomposed into risk aversion and uncertainty following Bekaert et al. (2013) .
As noted in Bekaert et al. (2013) , examining the link between monetary policy and implied volatility may be important for three reasons. First, the relation between monetary policy and financial stability remains a topic of debate, particularly following the financial crisis of . Implied volatility provides a forward looking, market-based view of stability, and we are able to identify the link between scheduled meetings and this view. Second, greater economic uncertainty is linked to lower employment (Bloom, 2009 and Bloom et al., 2009) . Thus, the link between scheduled central bank meetings and uncertainty measures, such as implied volatility indices, may be relevant. Third, understanding the relation between scheduled central bank meetings and implied volatility may add to our understanding of the relation between monetary policy and the stock market.
Our first results confirm previous work which finds that FOMC meeting days are uncertainty resolving in the U.S. VIX drops on scheduled meeting days regardless of the content of such meetings. Most strikingly, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to find that ECB meeting days are related to a decline in the German implied volatility index (VDAX), conditional on the meeting containing either no rate surprise or a negative rate surprise, and are unrelated to VDAX when rate increases are announced. In short, both the ECB and FOMC are uncertainty resolving domestically, however the relation for ECB meetings is less robust and economically smaller in magnitude. ECB meeting days are unrelated to VIX, indicating that ECB rate decisions are not related to uncertainty resolution in U.S. markets. Conversely, in our cross-border analysis, we find that FOMC meeting days do, in fact, appear to help resolve uncertainty in German markets as VDAX declines on meeting days. This is indicative of a stronger international effect from scheduled U.S. central bank meetings than scheduled European central bank meetings. When decomposing VIX and VDAX into their respective risk aversion and uncertainty components, we find that FOMC meetings are associated with reductions in VIX (VDAX) risk aversion (uncertainty). The results suggest that the ECB and FOMC differ in terms of the market response to their interest rate decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and develops hypotheses, Section 3 discusses data and methodology, Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Recent literature has documented the relation between FOMC scheduled meetings and VIX changes. Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004) , Chen and Clements (2007) , Vahamaa and Aijo (2011), and Krieger et al. (2012) find evidence of VIX declines following FOMC announcements.
However, the focuses and approaches of these papers differ. Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004) and Chen and Clements (2007) consider FOMC announcements and document that FOMC meetings are linked with drops in VIX. They do not, however, consider cross-border impacts or separately consider whether surprises within announcements are particularly meaningful. Vahamaa and Aijo (2011), for instance, conclude that positive rate surprises are uncertainty inducing while negative surprises resolve uncertainty. By contrast, Krieger et al. (2012) , focusing only on domestic impacts in the U.S., find that VIX declines on FOMC meeting days regardless of premeeting VIX levels or the nature of the FOMC's decision (increase, decrease, or no change to rates); thus, they interpret their findings as evidence that all FOMC meeting dates tend to provide uncertainty resolution. A related line of literature structural has indicated that monetary policy (measured more generally by the interest rate environment) is related to implied volatility. For instance, Bekaert et al. (2013) employ a structural VAR approach to examine the relation between monetary policy and the components of implied volatility, risk aversion, and uncertainty. They find that monetary policy influences both risk aversion and uncertainty; however, the economic and statistical significance is much greater with respect to risk aversion.
Their focus is entirely on domestic effects of U.S. monetary policy. Overall, the literature suggests that on FOMC meeting days VIX will decline.
As a starting point we begin our analysis herein by briefly reexamining the VIX-FOMC scheduled meeting relationship with the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 -VIX changes are unrelated to scheduled FOMC meeting days.
The literature establishes some relation between ECB announcements and financial markets. Hussain (2011) , for example, focuses on the impacts of monetary policy surprises on European and U.S. stock index returns and volatility. Sensitive, intraday data reveals short-term reactions to policy actions, and the author also demonstrates the additional explanatory importance of the press conferences that accompany ECB announcements. Furthermore, the impact of target components and path surprise components of decisions, discussed by Gurkaynak (2005) , are separated, and it is revealed that markets are not responsive to path surprises. Additionally, Hussain (2011) is able to decouple effects of potential simultaneous announcements of U.S. economic data, which is an issue in about 40% of the 2000-2008 observations. However, the literature has not addressed, to the best of our knowledge, the relation between ECB meetings and implied volatility. Jiang et al. (2012) note that, in a single-country setting, the effect of news announcements on implied volatility depends on whether the release is scheduled or unscheduled. Their analysis considers ECB meetings, but they simultaneously consider many other types of announcements and do not isolate ECB meetings for specific study. To the extent that the ECB and FOMC are similar, we may expect to find European implied volatility declines on ECB meeting days. This may be due to the same type of information uncertainty resolution evidenced in the U.S. However, the ECB and FOMC may differ in key ways as well. The charges of the ECB and FOMC do differ (e.g., the FOMC focuses on U.S. employment, as well as price stability, while the ECB's focus is more strictly tied to price control). Key differences between the ECB and FOMC may be relevant to the response of European implied volatility and ECB meeting days. For instance, a result of interest from Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007 Our initial analysis focuses on changes in VIX and VDAX on FOMC and ECB meeting days.
Dickey-Fuller unit root test results are found in Appendix A. In the case of VIX and VDAX, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected regardless of the lag used. Our formal test of the relation between scheduled central bank meetings and implied volatility is in the form of a seemingly unrelated VAR(1) regression. 11 Our model is based on that of Jiang et al. (2012) who examine volatility spillover between the U.S. and Europe. However, unlike Jiang et al. (2012) , the focus of our paper is on scheduled central bank meetings only, as opposed to many general news releases, and on the differences between scheduled and unscheduled meetings. We first estimate the following equation which establishes the volatility spillover results:
where ∆ = − −1 is a (2 x 1) vector of changes in the implied volatility indices for the U.S. and Germany, C is a vector of constants, and is a (2 x 2) matrix of coefficients. We generalize equation (1) to include indicator variables for FOMC and ECB meeting days. This generalized model allows us to test the relation between scheduled FOMC and ECB meeting days and implied volatility in the U.S. and Germany while controlling for volatility spillover.
As part of our analysis, we also consider whether the responses of volatility indices to scheduled announcements of interest rate policy are driven by whether the contents of the announcements are expected or unexpected. In doing so, we seek to better delineate whether the clarity provided by the announcement or the specific policy announced is more meaningful. In order to proceed, we utilize the methodology of Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) . 12 Specifically, we use the overnight EONIA rates for the ECB and overnight LIBOR rates for the U.S. The surprise measure is the change in these key interest rates on the day of the policy decision.
13
In order to provide robustness via an additional methodology common in the monetary policy literature, as well as to focus on decomposed implied volatility, we closely follow Bekaert et al. (2013) in a structural VAR analysis. Our initial model is a five-variable structural VAR.
Two of the five variables follow Bekaert et al. (2013) directly. Specifically, we include the U.S.
interest rate as a measure of the monetary policy environment and the log-difference of U.S.
industrial production to measure the business cycle. While Bekaert et al. (2013) include decomposed VIX, we include changes in VIX and changes in VDAX. Finally, we include an indicator for FOMC meetings. The reason for our departure from Bekaert et al. (2013) on the final three variables is that we are interested in addressing the market response to scheduled FOMC meetings rather than monetary policy shocks more generally. However, we conduct 12 FOMC results are robust to modeling surprises following the methodology of Krueger and Kuttner (1996) , Kuttner (2001) , and Soderstrom (2001) which uses 30-day federal funds futures data (not reported for brevity but available upon request). Such data is not available to us for a European equivalent so results reported in this paper focus on short term interest rates, which yield a surprise measure for both FOMC and ECB meetings. 13 Results are robust to the use of one-month rates rather than overnight rates. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) . They find that 62% of all ECB statements are "neutral" while only 32% of all FOMC statements are "neutral." The higher frequency of ECB interest rate, decision-related meetings may also drive volatility's lack of response to such decisions. Overall, the lack of VIX response to ECB meetings is not surprising given that the literature has found that U.S. news in general drives European markets more than the converse (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005 , Jiang et al., 2012 , and Dimpfl and Peter, 2014 .
However, the lack of VDAX or VSTOXX response to ECB is somewhat unexpected. The literature generally finds that ECB communications warrant a response in European markets (e.g., Conrad and Lamla, 2010 who find exchange rate reaction to ECB meetings). Given that our results are qualitatively identical for VDAX and VSTOXX in Table 1 (and elsewhere in unreported results), we only report and focus on VDAX results from this point forward. Table 2 sorts meeting days based on the VIX and VDAX levels at the time of the scheduled FOMC and ECB meeting days. Relatively higher implied volatility indices are related to higher levels of uncertainty. During periods which experience higher levels of uncertainty, the possibility of greater uncertainty reduction following FOMC and ECB meetings exists.
Consistent with Krieger et al. (2012) we find that VIX declines on FOMC meeting days are more extreme when VIX is higher. ECB meeting influence on VIX is not systematically related to the level of VIX at the time of the meetings. This is consistent with the insignificant relation between VIX and ECB meetings seen in Table 1 . significance given that the sample is split into small sub-samples.
[Insert Table 2 Here] Table 3 shows the results for the VAR (1) model in equation (1). This model controls for volatility spillover between the U.S. and German market identified in Jiang et al. (2012) . Panels A and B of Table 3 recreate the basic volatility spillover result from that paper using levels and percent changes in volatility, respectively. We confirm that lagged VIX is positively related to contemporaneous VDAX, which indicates volatility spillover from the U.S. to Germany. We further confirm the absence of volatility spillover from Germany to the U.S.
In Panels C and D of [Insert Table 3 Here]
The results above do not consider the content of the central bank meeting, simply its occurrence. In Table 4 we isolate the changes in VIX and VDAX relative to the content of the rate decision of the ECB and FOMC (i.e., increase, decrease, or no change). In Panel A of Table   4 we find that VIX declines on FOMC meeting days regardless of the content of the meeting.
Similarly, VDAX declines on FOMC meeting days regardless of the content of the meeting.
Further, VDAX declines are economically larger than VIX declines on FOMC meetings days in which the rate declines. In both the rate increase and no change scenarios, the economic importance of VIX declines is greater than that of VDAX declines. While Jiang et al. (2012) do not isolate FOMC meeting announcements, our results are inconsistent with their conclusions, in regard to central bank meetings, as they find that implied volatility declines only on scheduled information release days from the U.S. to Europe. Our results suggest this does not depend on the content of the meeting. We provide tests of statistical significance in Table 4 , although we note that the sub-samples created are small in many cases and the tests may therefore lack power.
Panel B of Table 4 presents results for VIX and VDAX changes on ECB meeting days. Tables 1 and 3 , there is no identifiable relation between ECB meeting days and VIX changes. The results for VDAX changes on ECB days indicate that ECB meetings are generally uncertainty reducing when rates decline or are unchanged (declines occur 58% and 59% of the time, respectively) and are uncertainty inducing when rates rise (increases 54% of the time). Thus, unlike the relation between the FOMC and VIX, which is not dependent on the content of the meeting, the relation between the ECB and VDAX is contingent on the rate decision.
Consistent with results in
[Insert [Insert Table 5 Here]
In Table 5 , we present the mean and variance of LIBOR and EONIA overnight rate changes (i.e., surprise) on the days of FOMC and ECB meetings, respectively. We find that the surprise measure is very similar for FOMC and ECB. The mean absolute surprise for FOMC meetings days is 5.4bp and is 4.7bp for ECB meeting days. 16 These results are qualitatively consistent with the findings of Ehrmann and Fratzshcher (2007) and are quantitatively similar as well. Our absolute surprise measures are slightly larger than Ehrmann and Fratscher (2007) , but their sample ended in 2004 and ours extends through 2012.
16 LIBOR and EONIA rate changes are Winsorized at the 1% level.
In Table 6 , we examine VIX and VDAX responses to FOMC and ECB meetings based on surprise. Although ECB meetings were unrelated to VIX or VDAX in previous tables, we include ECB meetings in Table 6 . In Panel A of Table 6 we confirm the results of Krieger et al. (2012) in that VIX declines for all categories of surprise for FOMC meetings. The mean VIX change is not statistically significant in the negative surprise sample; however, with 23 observations, the power of the test is limited. We reconcile the difference between this lack of significance and the strong significance in Krieger et al. (2012) However, median and mean declines are only statistically significant for negative surprise meetings. This suggests that the relation between VDAX and FOMC meetings is more sensitive to the content of the meeting than the relation between VIX and FOMC meetings. Nonetheless, the sign of the VDAX changes is negative for all groups, and the surprise groups have relatively small samples (i.e., 21 observations for the non-significant positive surprise group).
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Panel B of Table 6 presents results for ECB meetings by surprise type. In all three groups (i.e., negative surprise, no surprise, and positive surprise) VIX change is unrelated to ECB meeting days. Thus, consistent with earlier tables, U.S. volatility does not appear to respond to ECB meetings regardless of the content of such meetings. Contrary to earlier results, which show no relation between ECB meetings and VDAX, we find evidence that VDAX declines on ECB meeting dates in which there is a negative rate surprise or no surprise (the positive surprise group is negative, but economically small and statistically insignificant). Thus, once we account for the surprise element of ECB meetings, we find that such meetings are uncertainty reducing in the majority of meeting outcomes (negative surprise and no surprise). While the relation between the ECB and VDAX differs from the relation between the FOMC and VIX, in the sense that FOMC meetings are uncertainty reducing in all situations (i.e., generally unconditional on meeting content), once we account for announcement surprise type,both the FOMC and ECB appear to reduce uncertainty domestically through rate announcements. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) note that the interdependence between U.S. and
European interest rates strengthened very late in their sample, which ended in 2003. They also concluded that one likely source for the interdependence was due to increasingly interdependent economies related to globalization. In Table 7 , we generalize this idea to our particular focus.
Specifically, we split our sample into three groups based on the period examined (1999-2002, 2003 to 2007, and 2008 to 2012) and examine VIX and VDAX changes on FOMC meeting days in each period. We focus only on FOMC meeting days, given the lack of relation between implied volatility and ECB meeting days observed in earlier tables in which the surprise is not considered.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
The results in Table 7 indicate that VIX declines on FOMC meeting days in all subperiods examined. The economic significance is roughly 50% larger (in terms of % change) in the most recent period compared to the earliest period. This is likely due to the financial crisis In Panels G-J, we follow Bekaert et al. (2013) by decomposing implied volatility into uncertainty and risk aversion components. Similar to Bekaert et al. (2013) we find that in the U.S. the FOMC is most related to risk aversion (see Panels G and H). We are the first, to our knowledge, to examine this decomposition in the context of German implied volatility. Our results indicate that the decline in VDAX surrounding FOMC meeting days is mostly driven by a decline in uncertainty (see Panels I and J).
Conclusion
We consider the similarities and differences between the volatility responses by U.S. and
European markets to news of governmental interest rate policy. We determine that market volatility tends to decline when scheduled interest rate policy announcements are made in the U.S. This is the case regardless of whether (and to what degree) the announcement actually releases unexpected information. This effect has remained consistent for a number of years. The relation between the ECB and European volatility is less robust and economically smaller and indicates that uncertainty is only resolved in the case of no rate surprise or a negative rate surprise.
There are significant differences between U.S. and European cross-border effects, however. European market volatility levels decline substantially in response to U.S. interest rate policy announcements (FOMC meetings) but U.S. volatility levels do not respond to ECB meeting announcements. The U.S. market volatility measure, VIX, is more responsive to U.S.
interest rate policy announcements, but there is a spillover effect into the German market volatility measure, VDAX, which serves as a European proxy.
Our conjecture is that U.S. FOMC meetings provide more uncertainty resolution than the corresponding European ECB meetings, and thus market volatility is reduced to a greater degree in response. This may be due to the less neutral tone of typical announcements of FOMC meetings or the market's relative attentiveness to U.S. interest rate policy, even in Europe.
The collective results of our paper have important policy implications. First, when seeking to influence domestic uncertainty, central banks must be mindful that the actions of other nations' central banks may in part negate or enhance their own. Specifically, given that FOMC meetings are related to European implied volatility, the actions of the FOMC may need to be considered when setting European monetary policy. Additionally, the actions of the FOMC may need to recognize the international influence of such actions. Second, there is reason to believe that central banks may impact uncertainty as implied volatility tends to decline on domestic central bank meeting days both in Europe and the U.S. Third, the component of implied volatility related to FOMC differs between the U.S. and Europe. In the U.S., FOMC meetings are on average associated with a decline in risk aversion, although the effect is short-lived. In Europe, FOMC meetings are on average associated with a decline in uncertainty, and the effect is shortlived. Thus, it does not appear that U.S. monetary policy is able to influence risk taking in Europe in the short-run. 
